INTRODUCTION
AN INDIVIDUAL manipulates a system of voting if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures a result he prefers to the result that would obtain if he expressed his true preferences. For systems of pure voting, where chance plays no role in settling which alternative is adopted, the following result is known: such a scheme, if it is to preclude individual strategic manipulation, must either make someone dictator, or restrict the possible outcome to a fixed pair of alternatives.
(See Gibbard [6] and Satterthwaite [13] ). This paper deals with systems of voting of a more general kind: systems by which a social decision is made through a combination of voting and chance. It will be shown that any such scheme, if it is to preclude individual strategic manipulation, must be a probability mixture of schemes, each of which either (i) accords a monopoly of influence to a single vo or (ii) restricts the final outcome to a fixed pair of alternatives. Schemes of the kind I shall call unilateral; of the second kind, duple.
What is meant here by a combination of voting with chance? Suppose a decision is made in the following way: first, voting of some kind is used to pick out a set of one or more winning alternatives; then, in case there is more than one such winner, one of them is chosen by lot. Such a scheme, in effect, uses the way people vote to determine the probability each alternative has of being adopted. This I shall take as the defining feature of a scheme which combines voting with chance: on the basis of the way people vote, it assigns to each alternative a probability of being adopted.
This paper deals only with voting by rank order ballot: in the schemes to be considered here, voting consists in each voter's ranking the alternatives in a professed order of preference. An individual is not allowed to express indifference between alternatives. The theorem in this paper applies to all systems of the kind I have characterized: to all systems by which voters' rank order ballots-no ' I have been helped in revising this paper by conversations with Mark Satterthwait Schwartz, and Hugo Sonnenschein, and by letters from Peter Fishburn and Richard Zeckhau grateful to the referee for remarkably detailed suggestions for shortening the proof of th theorem.
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indifference allowed-determine the probability of each alternative's being adopted.
Systems of this kind will be called decision schemes, and they are defined, more precisely, as follows. Let there be a finite set of mutually exclusive alternatives, from which the community must select exactly one. Each voter ranks the alternatives on his ballot in professed order of preference. On the basis of these orderings, a probability of being adopted is assigned to each alternative, and the final choice is made by a suitable chance device. A decision scheme, then, is a function of the following kind. Let there be n voters, and let V be the set of mutually incompatible alternatives open to the community. Call an ordering of V with no tries a ranking and call an n-tuple of rankings a ranking n-tuple. Finally, let a lottery be an assignment of a probability to each alternative, with the probabilities adding up to one. A decision scheme is a function d whose domain is the set of all preference n-tuples, and whose values are lotteries.
How can manipulability be defined for decision schemes? A decision scheme is manipulable if there is a logically possible situation in which someone manipulates it, and an individual manipulates a decision scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures a lottery he prefers to the lottery that would have obtained if he had expressed his true preferences. Whether he manipulates the scheme, then, depends on his preferences among lotteries. Now if an ordering of lotteries satisfies rationality conditions such as those of von Neumann and Morgenstern [8, p. 26] , then it can most conveniently be given by an assignment of cardinal utilities to the alternatives. Whether individual k manipulates the scheme to his advantage, then, depends not only on the way everyone else votes, the way k votes, and the way k genuinely orders the alternatives; it depends further on the way k genuinely orders lotteries-on k's cardinal utilities.
Manipulability, then, can be characterized as follows. In the first place, k manipulates decision scheme d if (i) where the actual votes are given by ranking n-tuple (P1, . . . , Pn) and k's true utility scale is U, k's avowed ranking Pk is not the ranking of the alternatives given by scale U, and (ii) if k had voted the ranking given by scale U, he would have secured a lottery of lower expected utility, as reckoned by U, than the lottery he actually secures. A decision scheme d is manipulable, then, if for some ranking n-tuple (P1, ... ., Pn) for some person k, and for some utility scale U, k manipulates d. If it is not manipulable, it will be called strategy-proof. These definitions are given explicitly in Section 4.
Unattractive examples of strategy-proof decision schemes are not hard to find.
Here are three: SCHEME 1: Put everyone's ballot in a hat, draw one at random, and choose the alternative which is ranked first on that ballot. (For a discussion of this scheme, see Gibbard, [6, , and Zeckhauser, [18, pp. 938-940] .) SCHEME 2: First collect the ballots. Next, put the names of the alternatives in a hat and select two at random. Then use the collected ballots to decide between those two alternatives by majority vote. This amounts to a decision scheme, since under it, the ballots cast determine the probability of each alternative's being adopted. Now if a voter misrepresents his preferences under this scheme, it can SCHEMES THAT MIX VOTING WITH CHANCE 667 affect the outcome only to his disadvantage. His misrepresentation can affect the outcome only if the following holds: for some pair of alternatives x and y, he prefers x to y but ranks y above x on his ballot, the names of x and y are drawn from the hat, and he swings the outcome from x to y by his vote-thus getting an outcome he likes less than the honest outcome.2 SCHEME 3: A coin is flipped, and Scheme 1 is used if the coin lands heads; Scheme 2 if the coin lands tails.
It might have been hoped that there were strategy-proof decision schemes more attractive than these: schemes, for instance, which select one or more optimal alternatives in a reasonable way on the basis of the way people vote, and then, in case there is more than one optimal alternative, choose the alternative actually to be adopted from among them by chance. The theorem in this paper shows, however, that all strategy-proof decision schemes are much like the unattractive schemes I have given as examples: all involve, in effect, selecting a ballot or a pair of alternatives by chance, and either ignoring all ballots but the one selected, or choosing somehow between the two selected alternatives. All, in other words, are probability mixtures of schemes, each of which is either unilateral or duple.
The precise statement and proof of this theorem are given in Section 4. Three corollaries are stated and proved in Section 5. The first is this: suppose a decision scheme guarantees Pareto optimal outcomes. Suppose, in other words, that no matter how people vote, if one alternative is unanimously outranked by another, then it gets a probability of zero. Suppose also that there are at least three alternatives, and that the decision scheme is strategy-proof. Then the decision scheme is a probability mixture of dictatorial schemes. 3 The second corollary is this. Suppos& a decision scheme gives lotteries which are Pareto optimal ex ante, where a lottery is Pareto optimal ex ante if there is no other lottery which is unanimously preferred to it. Suppose, in other words, that no matter what each person's utility scale is, if each person votes the ranking of alternatives given by his utility scale, then the resulting lottery p has this property:
there is no other lottery p' which ranks higher than p on everyone's utility scale.
Suppose, as before, that there are at least three alternatives, and that the decision scheme is strategy-proof. Then the decision scheme is dictatorial-it is not, that is to say, merely a probability mixture of dictatorial schemes; it is itself dictatorial. This corollary extends to schemes which allow the expression of individual indifference.
The third corollary is simply the earlier theorem on non-chance voting schemes [6] . The proof in this paper, then, constitutes a new proof of that earlier theorem. 2 Zeckhauser [18, p. 939 ] describes an extension of the "random dictator system" as follows:
"Provide each voter with q ballots for his first choice, r for his second, s for his third, etc., with q > r > s. The selection procedure is random as before." He goes on to say, "Thus we find that only variants of the random dictator system will elicit ballots unique with respect to individuals' . . . ordinal preferences." (Being 'unique' in Zeckhauser's terminology is roughly the same as being "strategy-proof" in mine). If by "variants of the random dictator system" he means systems of the form specified in the passage I have quoted, then Scheme 2 is a counterexample to this claim.
BACKGROUND
The notion of manipulability used in this paper is a variant of the one formulated by Dummett and Farquharson [2] [15, pp. 192-196] , and Pattanaik [9, 10, 11, and 12] . The theorem cited at the outset of this paper is proved independently, in quite different ways, by Gibbard [6] and Satterthwaite [13] . A precise statement of the theorem is this: any scheme which uses rank order balloting in a nonchance way to select a single alternative is either manipulable, dictatorial (in that someone is guaranteed his first choice from among the possible outcomes), or restricted to no more than two possible outcomes. This result holds both for schemes which allow individual indifference to be expressed and for schemes which do not. A streamlined proof of the theorem is given by Schmeidler and Sonnenschein [14] . This earlier theorem does not apply to systems of voting which allow tied outcomes. In my discussion of that theorem [6, pp. 592-593], I argued that it makes no sense to study the manipulability of schemes which allow ties unless one considers the system by which ties are to be broken. If ties are to be broken by chance, I argued, then the full system to be studied in effect yields outcomes which are lotteries among alternatives.
It was Zeckhauser [17] who broached the study of voting with lotteries as alternatives. Fishburn [4 and 5] studies the subject further. A subsequent paper by Zeckhauser [18] is on virtually the topic of this paper. There Zeckhauser studies systems of voting which rely on individuals' self-interested balloting and may have lotteries as outcomes. He concludes [18, Theorem V, p. 945 ] that no such system can guarantee an outcome which is both ex ante Pareto optimal and, in a special sense, "nondictatorial". (For the case of two voters, an outcome is "dictatorial" in Zeckhauser's sense if it is the first choice of one voter and the last choice of the other). Zeckhauser's result is logically independent of the one in this paper. It is stronger in one respect: the results here are confined to systems with rank order balloting, whereas Zeckhauser's is not. Zeckhauser, on the other hand, requires that the lotteries that serve as outcomes of the schemes he considers be Pareto optimal ex ante, and, in his special sense, "nondictatorial". The main theorem in this paper does not invoke Pareto optimality, and whereas the second corollary here is suggested by Zeckhauser's result, Zeckhauser's nondictatorship condition is much stronger than the nondictatorship condition in the corollary. Zeckhauser's result, then, neither directly entails the results in this paper nor is directly entailed by them.
INDIVIDUAL INDIFFERENCE
The main result in this paper fails when extended to systems that permit a voter to express indifference between alternatives. No doubt the easiest example of this failure is a serial dictatorship. Let a fixed "dictator" always get his first choice, and if more than one alternative ties as his first choice, let a "prime henchman" get his first choice from among the alternatives the dictator likes best. Let further ties be broken arbitrarily, say by selecting the tying alternative which is first on some predetermined list. Now a serial dictatorship is clearly strategy-proof: neither the dictator, the prime henchman, nor anyone else can ever gain by misrepresenting his preferences. If there are more than two alternatives, however, then the serial dictatorship is not equivalent to any probability mixture of unilateral or duple schemes, as the following considerations show.
Note at the outset that a serial dictatorship is not unilateral. A scheme is unilateral, in the sense the term has been given here, only if it accords a single voter-call him the ruler-a monopoly of influence, so that no matter how anyone votes, the ballots of all voters other than the ruler are ignored. Under a serial dictatorship, the ballot of the prime henchman is not invariably ignored, and hence a serial dictatorship is not itself unilateral. Now a serial dictatorship is not a probability mixture which has any duple scheme as a part. If it were, then for at least one fixed pair of alternatives, the probability of the adopted alternative's being in that pair would have to be nonzero independently of how anyone voted. Under a serial dictatorship, both alternatives in any pair have probability zero of being adopted whenever neither is a first choice of the dictator. Thus if a serial dictatorship is a probability mixture of schemes each of which is unilateral or duple, then it is a probability mixture of unilateral schemes alone.
The only unilateral schemes that could be part of this mixture, though, are ones for which the dictator is ruler. Otherwise, there would be a nonzero chance that no matter what the dictator's ballot said, it would be ignored, so that for some way the dictator and others might vote, an alternative which was not the first choice of the dictator would be adopted with nonzero probability. Under a serial dictatorship, on the other hand, the probability that the dictator will fail to get his first choice (or one of his first choices in case he has no unique first choice) is always zero. Thus if a serial dictatorship were a probability mixture of unilateral and duple schemes, it would have to consist of a single unilateral scheme with the dictator as ruler-and we have already seen that it does not.
A serial dictatorship, then, is not a probability mixture of schemes which are unilateral or duple, and hence the theorem in this paper does not in general extend to systems which allow individuals to express indifference.
What, then, can be said about systems with ballots which do allow individual indifference to be expressed? What the theorem here tells us is this: if such a system s is strategy-proof, then there is a probability mixture m of unilateral and duple schemes which coincides with s whenever no one is indifferent between any pair of alternatives. For any ranking n-tuple P with no ties, in other words, m assigns the same prospect to P as does s.
The force of the theorem, then, extends to systems which allow individuals to express indifference. For the force of the theorem lies in the judgment that any probability mixture of unilateral and duple schemes is grossly defective as a way of making community decisions. What the theorem says about systems with no individual indifference is, in effect, that nonmanipulability can be had only in systems which are otherwise grossly defective. Now take a system which is nonmanipulable and allows individual indifference. For all cases in which no one is indifferent between alternatives, the system is a fixed mixture of unilateral and duple schemes. That in itself is a gross defect: for a significant class of combinations of individual preferences, the system stands ready to make the community choice in an unacceptable way. The theorem in this paper shows, then, that even in systems which permit a voter to express indifference, nonmanipulability may be had only at an exhorbitant price.
DEFINITIONS AND PROOFS
Let V be a finite set, called the set of alternatives. Variables w, x, y, and z will have V as their range of values. A strict ordering of V is a binary relation P which,
for all x, y, and z, satisfies:
Asymmetry: xPy -* -yPx.
Negative transitivity: xPy -> (xPz v zPy).
Such a relation is transitive, and may allow indifference between alternatives.
A ranking of V is a strict ordering of V which, for all x and y, satisfies:
Connectedness: x ? y -> (xPy v yPx).
A ranking n-tuple over V is an n-tuple (Pl, . .. , Pn) of rankings of V. Ranking n -tuples will be represented by bold type on the pattern: P = (Pl,... , PPn), P* = (Pt,... , P*), and the like. P and P' agree off k iff for all i # k, P' = Pi. P/kP is the preference n -tuple P' such that P' = P and P' agrees with P off k.
We now define "proto-scheme", "scheme", and "decision scheme". A measure over V is a function p which assigns a nonnegative real number, p(x), to each member x of V. The sum :x p(x) of these numbers is called the weight of th measure. A lottery is a measure of weight one.
A proto -scheme is a function d such that, for some positive integer n, called the number of voters of d, and for some finite set V, whose members are called alternatives of d, the domain of d is the set of all ranking n-tuples over V, and the values of d are measures over V. The value of d at P will be written dP, and the probability dP assigns to an alternative x will be written d(x, P). A scheme is a proto-scheme all of whose values have the same weight; this will be called the weight of the scheme. A decision scheme is a scheme of weight one. It thus assigns to each ranking n-tuple P a lottery over V.
We consider, then, a fixed set V of alternatives and number n of voters. The variables will range as follows: w, x, y, and z are alternatives in V; X, Y, and Z are sets of alternatives, i.e., subsets of V; P and Q are rankings of V; P and Q are ranking n -tuples (Pi, . .. , Pn) over V; i, j, and k are integers from 1 to n w stand for voters; b, c, and d are schemes for n voters and set V of alternatives. Subscripts, superscripts, primes, and the like do not affect the range of variables. A utility scale U over V is an assignment of real numbers to the members of V. Where U is a utility scale over V and p is a lottery over V, we define the expected utility U(p) of p on scale U in this way: U(p) = Xx U(x)p(x). Utility scale Ufits a strict ordering P iff for all x and y, U(x) > U(y) <--xPy.
A decision scheme d is potentially manipulable by k at P iff there are a utility scale U which fits Pk and a ranking P, of V such that where P'=PlkPk, U(dP') > U(dP). A decision scheme d is manipulable iff there are a voter k and a ranking n -tuple P such that d is potentially manipulable by k at P. Otherwise, d is strategy-proof.
We now give a number of definitions which will allow the theorem on strategyproof decision schemes to be stated in a preliminary, weak version. DEFINITION 1: Scheme d is unilateral iff there is a k such that for all P and P', if P'= Pk, then dP'= dP. This theorem can be strengthened to give conditions which are sufficient as well as necessary for a decision scheme's being strategy-proof. For any set X of alternatives and scheme d, we shall write d(X, P) for YZx,x d(x, P), the probability assigned by measure dP to members of X. X heads ranking Pk iff any x eX and y X, xPky. DEFINITION 4: Proto scheme d is localized iff for every k, P, P', and X such that X heads both Pk and P', d(X, P/kP') = d(X, P).
A switch is a reversal of two adjacent alternatives in a ranking. A scheme is nonperverse if switching an alternative upward never decreases its probability. DEFINITION 5: XPk !y means that XPky and -(3z)(xPkz and zPky). Where xPk!y, P' is the ranking which switches xy in Pk and permutes no other alternative, pkY =P/kPk, and EY(d, P), the effect under d of k's switching y upward, is d(y, pky) -d(y, P). Scheme d is nonperverse iff for every P, k, and y such that {y} does not head Pk, E Y(d, P) -0. for all x, y, P, and k such that xPk !y, d ({x, y}, pky) = d({x, y}, P).
PROOF. Suppose d is a localized proto-scheme. Then since V heads any P and P*, d(V, P) = d(V, P), and d is a scheme. Now suppose thatxPk!y, zj {x, W is the set of alternatives ranked above z in pk. Then both Wand Wu {z} head both Pk and Py. Thus since d is localized, k's switching y upward changes neither the total probability of W nor the total probability of Wu {z}. Thus it leaves the probability of z unchanged, and d is pairwise responsive. Thus (i) entails (ii). For any pairwise responsive scheme, a switch of xy changes neither the total probability of V-{x, y} nor that of V; thus it leaves that of {x, y} unchanged, and (ii) entails (iii). Now suppose (iii); it follows that if xPk!y and {x, y} c Z, then d(Z, pky) = d(Z, P). If Z heads both Pk and P', then P' can be formed from Pk by switches between members of Z and switches between nonmembers of Z, neither of which, we have seen, change the total probability of Z. Thus d is localized, and (iii) entails (i). PROOF: Suppose that d is not localized, so that for some k, some P and P' that agree off k, and some X which heads both Pk and Pk, d(X, P') -d(X, P) = > 0.
Let U fit Pk and be such that for all xeX, 1 U(x)<1+E, and for all yiX,
Therefore U(dP') > U(dP), and so d is potentially manipulable by k at P.
If d is localized but perverse, then for some x, y, and k, XPk !y and k's switching y upwards lowers the probability of y by some amount E > 0. By (iii) of Lemma 1, the switch raises the probability of x by E, and changes no other probabilities.
Hence, if U fits Pk, so that U(x) > U(y), then U(dpkY) -U(dP) = ?U(x) -?U(y) > 0, and so d is potentially manipulable by k at P. Now suppose d is localized and nonperverse, and consider any k, P, P', and U which fits Pk. Where P' = P/kPk, we shall show that U(dP') -U(dP). Form Pk it from its position in Pk successively to the top, then take the second alternative in P, and switch it successively up from its position in Pk to its position in P', and so forth. At each step, an alternative y is switched with an alternative which is above it in Pk. Since U fits Pk, U(x)> U(y), and so by (iii) of Lemma 1 and the nonperversity of d, utility on scale U cannot be increased by such steps. Hence U(dP') -U(dP). That proves the Lemma.
DEFINITION 7: Pi t {x, y} is Pi restricted to {x, y}, and P t {x, y}= (P1 t {x, y}, . . . , Pn t {x, y}). A scheme d is pairwise isolated iff for any k, and y, if xPk ! y, P* = Pk, and P* t {x, y} = P t {x, y}, then E Y (d, Now let XPk !y, P* = Pk, and P* t {x, y} = P t {x, y}. Then P* can be formed from P by a sequence of switches by voters other than k, none of which switches x with y. We have just seen that none of these changes the value of 4 , and thus ?(d, P*) = k(d, P). Thus d is pairwise isolated.
PROOF THAT d IS DECOMPOSABLE: Take k, x, and y with x $ y. For any P wit XPk !y, define y(P t {x, y}) = EY(d, Pkxy). Now let P and P* be such that XPk !y P* = Pk; we shall show (1) ? Y(d, P*)-y(P*1T{X, y} = ? Y(d, P)-y(Pt{x, y}).
Since d is pairwise isolated, Y(d, P) depends only on Pk and P t {x, y}; thu may suppose without loss of generality that ' teryone other than k ranks x and y last. Now form pk from Pk by the following sequence of switches. Call this sequence P?k,.. ., Pk, and consider the difference (2) d (y, P/kP) -d (y, P /kPk) as t goes from 0 to ,u. This difference changes only in step (c). For the steps and (d) consist of switching y with various alternatives z i {x, y}. Everyone ex k ranks z above y in both P and P*, and so since d is pairwise isolated, both terms of (2) change by the same amount, and (2) is unchanged. The steps in (b) and (e) consist of switching x with alternatives other than y; since d is pairwise responsive, this changes neither term of (2) . Now at step (c), x and y are switched in Pkxy. The change in (2) at step (c), then, is
This, then, is the change in (2) from t = 0 to t = g,u that is,
which is E Y(d, P) -E Y(d, P*). From the equality of this with (3), (1) follows. Since the quantity in (1) depends only on Pk, let 8(Pk) be this quantity; then 4Y(d, P) = y(P t {x, y}) + 8(Pk), and d is decomposable. DEFINITION 9: k's unilateral component of decision scheme d is the function dk such that for all x and P,
Since the value of dk (x, P) depends only on x and Pk, this will be written dk (x, Pk). (ii) dk is a scheme which is unilateral, localized, and nonperverse.
PROOF OF (i): Let xPk! y, let a = dk(y, Pk), and let 8 = dk(y, PY). Then 4(dk, P) = -a. Let E = minQ Y4(d, Q/kPk); we are to prove that ? = -a. Since c(z, P) 0 for all z and P, from the way c.y is defined, c'y(z, P)0
Moreover, cY ( V, P) = c({x, y}, P,y) and since c is localized, this is constant for all P, and cy is a scheme. cry is pairwise responsive and, hence, localized: an xy switch leaves all other probabilities zero, and any other switch leaves all prob- Suppose that d is not itself dictatorial, so that ai > 0 for more than one i. Let axk > 0, let x, y, and z be distinct alternatives, and let the utility scales U1, .. ., Un be as follows.
Uk (x) = 1, 1 > Uk (y) > ak, Uk (Z) =0, and for all wi{x, y, z}, Uk(w)<0.
For all i $ k, Ui(z)=1, 1>U1(y)>1-ak, Ui(x)=0, and for all wi{x, y, z}, Ui(w)<0.
For each i, let Pi fit Ui, so that {x} heads Pk and {z} heads Pi for all i $ k. Then d(x, P) = ak, d(z, P) = 1-ak, and d(w, P) =0 for all w distinct from x and y. Therefore Uk (dP) = ak, and for i ? k, Ui (d, P) = 1 -ak. Now let 9 be the lottery that gives y as a sure thing. Then Uk (9) > ak and for i$# k, U1(9) > 1-xak. Therefore for all i, iJ(9) > Ui(dP), and so dP is not Pareto optimal ex ante for U1, . . ., Un. On the supposition that d is not dictatorial, we PROOF OF (i): Suppose x is a possible outcome of d but not of d'. Let P be a ranking n-tuple such that x ranks first in every Pi, and let P* be a preference n-tuple such that d(x, P*) >O. Form a sequence of preference n-tuples pO... Xpn as follows: let Po = P, and for each i, let P = Pil/IPi*, pn p*. Then since Po is a ranking n-tuple and x is not a possible outcom we have that d(x, PF) =0, whereas d(x, pn) >0. Take the least j such that d(x, Fi) >O, and let d(x, Pi) = e. Then d(x, PI-) =O, and P'-j P,. Since P1 ran x first, there is a utility scale U which fits Pj, such that U(x) = 1 and for all y 0 S U(y) < E. Since d (x, Pi) = E, U(x) = 1, and for all y ? x, U(y) 3 0, we have tha U(dPi) -E. Since d(x, PF-') = 0 and for all y ? x, U(y) < E, we have that U(dP-') < E. Thus U(dP') > U(dP'-1), and since U fits Pj and Pj1= Pj, d is potentially manipulable by j at P'-1.
PROOF OF (ii): From (i), the possible outcomes of d and d' are the same. Now suppose k is weak dictator for d' but not for d. Then for some preference n-tuple P, where Xis the set of possible outcomes ranked first in Pk, d(X, P) ? 1. For some x E X, let P* rank x first, and for every i $ k, let P* rank x last. Let P0= P/kPk*.
Then d(x, PO) ? 1, for otherwise, on any utility scale U which fits Pk, we would have that U(dP?) = U(x) and U(dP) < U(x), so that U(dP?) > U(dP). Thus d would be potentially manipulable by k at P. Now form sequence po,.. ., letting Pi = Pil/P* for each i, so that PF = P*. Then since P" is a ranking n-tuple with k, who is weak dictator for d', ranking possible outcome x first, we have that d(x, pn) = 1. Take the least j such that d(x, Pi) = 1; then d(x, Pi1) < 1.
We know that j ? k, since from the way Pi is defined, pk = pk-l. Therefore x is at S Aspects of this proof are suggested by arguments in Zeckhauser [18] .
